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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Billy Lee Joslin challenges the district court's decision to admit, at his trial for
purportedly strangling and raping his ex-girlfriend, Ms. Darby, testimony that Mr. Joslin
strangled and raped his ex-wife, Ms. Joslin, ten years earlier.

In response to Mr. Joslin's

argument that Ms. Joslin's testimony was not relevant to prove a common scheme or plan, the
State invites this Court to adopt the non-existent "similar crimes" exception to Idaho Rule of
Evidence 404(b), fails to explain how Ms. Joslin's testimony was relevant to prove anything
other than propensity, and rests its argument wholly on the impermissible inference that "if he
did it once, he probably did it again." Further, the State has failed to meet its burden of showing,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that Ms. Joslin's irrelevant and extremely prejudicial testimony did
not contribute to the verdict actually rendered in this case. This Court should vacate Mr. Joslin' s
judgment of conviction and remand his case for a new trial.

1

ISSUE
Did the district court err and abuse its discretion by allowing the State to introduce irrelevant and
highly prejudicial testimony that Mr. Joslin strangled and raped his ex-wife ten years before
committing the alleged strangulation and rape in this case, and did that error surely contribute to
the verdicts?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Both Erred And Abused Its Discretion By Allowing The State To Introduce
Irrelevant And Highly Prejudicial Testimony That Mr. Joslin Strangled And Raped His Ex-Wife
Ten Years Before Committing The Alleged Strangulation And Rape In This Case, And That
Error Surely Contributed To The Verdicts

A.

Ms. Joslin's Testimony Was Purely Propensity Evidence That Was Not Relevant To Any
Permissible Purpose
In response to Mr. Joslin's argument that Ms. Joslin's testimony was not relevant to

prove a common scheme or plan, the State first claims that "the similarities between the
uncharged conduct and the conduct of which Joslin was charged in this case are remarkable,"
and thus "they show a plan by Joslin to accomplish sexual intercourse with women who have
rejected him by strangling them into submission." (Resp. Br., pp.15-16.) This argument, which
is identical to the reasoning employed by the district court in admitting this statement, relies
exclusively on the impermissible inference that "if he did it once, he probably did it again," and
amounts to the non-existent "similar crimes" crimes exception that Mr. Joslin already addressed
in his appellant's brief (See App. Br., pp.15-22.)

Importantly, the State has failed to identify

any permissible inference that can be drawn from crimes that are similar, or even identical, when
identity is not at issue, as opposed to crimes that are "linked in a way that permits the inference
that the prior conduct was planned as part of a course of conduct leading up to the charged
offense," or that "demonstrate a planned course of connected behavior." State v. Joy, 155 Idaho
1, 304 P.3d 276 (2013). To the extent it claims, for the first time on appeal, that at the time that
Mr. Joslin purportedly strangled and raped Ms. Joslin in 2006, he had a plan to strangle and rape
any women who would reject him in the future, the Court should dismiss that fanciful suggestion
as divorced from reality and unsupported by the record. (See Resp. Br., p.16.)
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Next, the State relies on a footnote in State v. Johnson, 148 Idaho 664, 668 n.3 (2010), to
argue that Ms. Joslin's testimony is admissible under the theory, never adopted by this Court,
that admits acts that "share a common methodology" if there is "evidence the perpetrator
consciously chose those common techniques." (Resp. Br., p.17.) It argues: "Under this theory,
recognized by other courts, there can be no question that evidence that Joslin strangled and raped
his ex-wife in 2006 was relevant in his prosecution for the attempted strangulation and rape of
C.D. to establish a common design or plan to sexually assault women with whom he had been in
a romantic relationship by strangling them into submission." (Resp. Br., pp.17-18.) The State
goes on to discuss cases from five other states in which the courts admitted propensity evidence
under the same "theory" the State advances here. (Resp. Br., pp.18-26 (discussing State v. Sites,
825 S.E.2d 758 (W. Va. 2019); Commonwealth v. Tyson, 119 A.3d 353 (Penn. 2015); People v.
Rath, 44 P.3d 1033 (Colo. 2002); State v. Lough, 889 P.2d 487 (Wash. 1995); People v. Ewoldt,
867 P.2d 757 (Cal. 1994).) This Court should reject the State's invitation to adopt that new
theory.
To begin, the State's suggested theory-that a mere conscious decision to commit similar
crimes renders them admissible as part of a common scheme or plan-was implicitly rejected in
Joy. There, the Court held that the charged and uncharged conduct must be "linked in a way that
permits the inference that the prior conduct was planned as part of a course of conduct leading
up to the charged offense," or must "demonstrate a planned course of connected behavior." Joy,
155 Idaho at 10 (emphasis added). In other words, the Joy Court made clear that only the most
restrictive theory discussed in Johnson passes muster.

See Johnson, 148 Idaho at 668 n.3

("Third, and most restrictive, the court could require the prior acts to actually be linked to the
charged conduct as part of an intentionally conceived grand design to achieve a specific criminal
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objective.").

At the same time, the State has once again failed to explain how consciously

choosing common techniques allows a jury to draw a permissible inference because none exists.
Its theory rests on nothing more than the impermissible inference that "if he did it once, he
probably did it again," and thus admits propensity evidence masquerading as "relevant"
evidence.
To be sure, the jurisdictions that have adopted the State's rationale have misconstrued
their Rule 404(b) equivalents in order to admit the very evidence that those rules are meant to
exclude.

See 1 McCormick On Evid. § 190 (7th ed.) (citing Edwolt disapprovingly as an

example of how "some courts construe 'common plan' more broadly (especially in sexual abuse
and domestic violence cases)," and reiterating that "each crime should be an integral part of an

over-arching plan explicitly conceived and executed by the defendant . ... ") (footnotes omitted,
emphasis added).

State v. Sites, 825 S.E.2d 758 (W. Va. 2019); Commonwealth v. Tyson,

119 A.3d 353 (Penn. 2015); People v. Rath, 44 P.3d 1033 (Colo. 2002); State v. Lough, 889 P.2d
487 (Wash. 1995); People v. Ewoldt, 867 P.2d 757 (Cal. 1994). As Professor Imwinkelried 1 has
explained:
Some courts are quite liberal in admitting uncharged misconduct under the rubric
of "plan." If the proponent can show a series of similar acts, these courts admit
the evidence on the theory that a pattern or systematic course of conduct is
sufficient to establish a plan. This tendency is especially pronounced in sex
offense prosecutions. Similarity or likeness between the crimes suffices. In
effect, these courts convert the doctrine into a plan-to-commit-a-series-of-similarcrimes theory.
This application of the plan theory is troublesome. Some commentators refer to
these plans as "unlinked act" cases while other commentators use the more
pejorative expression, "spurious plans." For the most part, the commentators
have been critical of the doctrine. Their criticism is well-founded.
1

The Johnson Court cited Professor Imwinkelried, the preeminent authority on the admission of
bad acts evidence, when discussing the three different theories that courts have used to admit
such evidence. See Johnson, 148 Idaho at 668 n.3.
5

1 Uncharged Misconduct Evidence § 3:24 (2018) (footnotes omitted). Unsurprisingly, many
jurisdictions have rejected the antithetical interpretation of Rule 404(b) adopted by some courts
and which the State promotes here, and instead have adopted a strict construction consistent with
that approved of by commentators, articulated in Joy, and advanced by Mr. Joslin in this appeal.
Seel McCormick On Evid. § 190 n.20 (surveying cases); U.S. v. Anderson, 933 F.2d 1261, 1272

n.7 (5th Cir. 1991) (noting that "it is not enough to show that each crime was planned in the
same way; rather, there must be some overall scheme of which each of the crimes is but a part");
U.S. v. Dothard, 666 F.2d 498, 502 (11th Cir. 1982) (explaining that "[c]ourts have admitted

extrinsic act evidence to show a defendant's design or plan to commit the specific crime charged,
but never to show a design or plan to commit 'crimes of the sort with which he is charged"');
State v. Cox, 781 N.W.2d 757, 770-71 (Iowa 2010) (explaining that "[t]he test for a common

scheme or plan is not simply a pattern of prior bad acts" or "the commission of two similar
crimes by the same person," and that Cox "essentially committed crimes of availability against
his [younger] cousins, which demonstrates nothing more than propensity"); State v. Gallegos,
152 P.3d 828, 838 (N.M. 2007) ("the fact that ... two crimes were 'planned' in the same way is
not enough.... There must be some overall scheme of which each of the crimes is but a part.");
State v. McFarland, 721 S.E.2d 62, 72-73 (W. Va. 2011) (finding the district court erred in

admitting evidence of McFarland's earlier sexual assaults in California because there was "no
evidence that [his] crime in the instant case was part of a common scheme or plan that began
several years earlier in California.").

That some courts have succumbed to very same

impermissible inference that Rule 404(b) seeks to preclude is simply not a good reason for this
Court to follow suit.
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In sum, Ms. Joslin's testimony was relevant only to propensity. Despite its claims that
her testimony was relevant to show a common scheme or plan, the State's failure to identify any
legitimate inference that can be drawn from the admission of Ms. Joslin' s testimony to prove
common scheme or plan reveals that its arguments are in fact based on the impermissible
inference that "if he did it once, he probably did it again." Because there is no "similar crimes"
exception under Rule 404(b), Ms. Joslin's testimony was nothing but inadmissible propensity
evidence, and the district court erred by admitting it.

B.

The State Has Failed To Meet Its Burden Of Proving Ms. Joslin's Testimony Was
Harmless Beyond A Reasonable Doubt
The State has not and cannot meet its burden of proving that Mr. Joslin's propensity

testimony was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. To begin, the State has attempted to lower
its burden of showing that the error did not contribute to the verdict actually obtained by relying
on two decisions from this Court in which it used language finding an error harmless based on
what a hypothetical jury would have done had it not heard the erroneously-admitted evidence.

(See Resp. Br., p.34 ("the jury would have reached same result even without the challenged
evidence because the evidence against Joslin was overwhelming") (citing State v. Montgomery,
163 Idaho 40, 46 (2017) ("In other words, the error is harmless if the Court finds that the result
would be the same without the error.") (quoting State v. Almaraz, 154 Idaho 584, 598 (2013))).
Despite the phrasing used in those two cases, the actual standard adopted by this Court in State v.

Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 221 (2008), is whether the State has proven, "beyond a reasonable doubt
that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained." Perry, 150 Idaho at 221
(quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)) (emphasis added).

Therefore, the

question "is whether the jury actually rested its verdict on evidence establishing the presumed
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fact beyond a reasonable doubt, independently of' the inadmissible evidence. Yates v. Evatt, 500
U.S. 391,404 (1991). "The inquiry ... is not whether, in a trial that occurred without the error, a
guilty verdict would surely have been rendered, but whether the guilty verdict actually rendered
in this trial was surely unattributable to the error." Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279
(1993) (emphasis added).
Applying the correct standard, the State has not and cannot meet its burden of proving
that Mr. Joslin's propensity testimony was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. As Mr. Joslin
explained in his appellant's brief, Ms. Joslin's testimony was the most damning evidence and
was presented at the very end of the trial, the prosecutor expressly relied on her testimony as
"corroboration" of Ms. Darby's testimony, and the district court's "limiting instruction" told the
jury it could consider Ms. Joslin's testimony for various things it was completely irrelevant to
proving. (See App. Br., pp.27-28.)

CONCLUSION
Mr. Joslin respectfully requests that this Court vacate his judgment of conviction and
remand this case to the district court for a new trial.
DATED this 18th day of June, 2019.

/s/ Maya P. Waldron
MAYAP. WALDRON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
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/s/ Teal M. Vosburgh
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MPW/tmv

9

